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CHILD CARE, WoRK, AND THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 
BRIAN WoLFMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the federal income tax treatment of em-
ployment-related child care expenses. It takes both a theoretical 
and historical approach, examining the various ways in which the 
Code has dealt with child care in relation to conventional tax no-
tions and values at play in the community at large. 
Part II outlines the history of the Code's various child care 
provisions. It is a critical analysis whose purpose is to decide 
whether any of the provisions which have existed can be explained 
by a particular tax theory. 
Part III asks whether employment-related child care expenses 
can be characterized as "business" or "personal" expenses. This 
question is asked in the hope that it can reveal what the proper tax 
treatment of employment-related child care expenses should be. 
Would the exclusion of such costs be a refinement of the taxpayer's 
income or just another loophole? 
The issue of the imputed income of home production is taken 
up in part IV. Should a deduction for child care and household 
services be allowed so as to provide tax neutrality between wage 
work and housework? 
Part V takes a second run through the history developed in 
part II. This time, however, the emphasis is sociological. I explore 
whether our reasons for preferring one child care provision over 
another, or over none at all, are more a product of underlying val-
ues regarding work and family than adherence to tax theory. 
Finally, in part VI, I discuss what type of child care provision 
I think the Code should have in light of what I have presented in 
*B.A. University of Pennsylvania, 1977; J.D. Harvard University, 1984. This paper was 
written for the Tax Policy Seminar at the Harvard Law School. 
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the paper. 
II. A CRITICAL HISTORY oF THE TAx TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE Ex-
PENSES FOR INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT 
A. SMITH V. COMMISSIONER 
Neither the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 nor the numerous 
revenue acts preceding it specifically allowed any deduction for 
child care expenses. Moreover, the tax law has contained since its 
inception a provision disallowing deductions "for personal, living 
or family expenses."1 Indeed, if such expenses were deductible, an 
individual taxpayer could effectively eliminate his or her tax base 
through a total consumption of earnings. 
Can personal, living or family expenses which the Internal 
Revenue Code generally considers nondeductible, be treated other-
wise when such expenses are incurred in an extraordinary context? 
This was the question presented in Smith v. Commissioner. 2 In 
Smith, a woman whose husband was already working entered the 
marketplace. Prior to this, Lillie Smith provided household ser-
vices in her home and cared for her infant son. As a result of the 
wife's decision to work outside the home, Lillie and her husband, 
Henry, hired nursemaids to take care of the child. 
The taxpayers sought to deduct the cost of the nursemaids. 
They argued that since the expenses would not have been incurred 
"but for" the wife's employment, the nursemaids' wages were "or-
dinary and necessary business expenses" within the meaning of 
section 162(a).3 The Board of Tax Appeals rejected this argument: 
Petitioners would have us apply the "but for" test .... This 
thought evokes an array of interesting possibilities. The fee to the 
doctor, but for whose healing services the earner of the family in-
come could not leave his sickbed, the cost of the laborer's raiment .. 
. , and the very home which gives us shelter and rest and the food 
which provides energy might all by an extension of the same pro-
position be construed as necessary to the operation of business and 
to the creation of income. Yet these are the very essence of those 
1. Today the relevant section is I.R.C. § 262. Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, only 
the section of the 1954 Code as amended will be cited. If other historical information is 
necessary it will be added in the text or notes. 
2. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), atf'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940). 
3. Actually, the taxpayers sought the deduction under a predecessor provision identi-
cal to § 162(a), Revenue Act of 1936, § 23(a), 49 Stat. 1649, 1658. 
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"personal" expenses the deductibility of which is expressly denied.• 
The Board's analysis was overbroad. "But for" causation is a 
necessary step in transforming an ordinarily personal expense into 
a business expense, but it certainly is not the only one. After estab-
lishing that "but for" a worker's food and shelter expenditures he 
or she would not have been fit to work, we should ask another 
question: "Would the expenditure have been incurred absent gain-
ful employment?"11 The answer to this question would generally be, 
"yes." Although in some instances unemployed individuals would 
not be able to obtain food and shelter, expenses for these items 
would generally be made absent employment.8 The Smiths would 
have continued to eat even if Lillie Smith had remained at home 
providing household services and taking care of her child. 7 
As to the Smith's child care expenses, however, the answ~r to 
the above question is definitely, "no." The child care expenses 
were only incurred because of Lillie Smith's decision to join the 
workforce. This distinguishes the child care expenditures of work-
ing parents from, say, food expenditures which are related to work, 
if at all, in a more attenuated way. 
This distinction is not necessarily dispositive of the issue 
presented in Smith. It does show, however, that the Board ad-
dressed the wrong issue-whether child care expenses in general 
should be treated like other personal expenses. 8 If it had focused 
more narrowly on the peculiar nature of child care expenses when 
incurred to enable an individual to work, it would have perceived, 
at least, a difference between the case before it and the near-com-
plete evaporation of the tax base it conjured up in its decision. 
Nevertheless, while the reasoning of Smith was not particu-
4. Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039. 
5. Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of 
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BuFF. L. REv. 49, 64 (1971). 
6. Without employment, however, the amount expended on necessities such as food, 
shelter and clothing would generally be less. 
7. If Lillie Smith had not gone into the marketplace, the value of the foregone wages 
with which the Smiths could have purchased food is less than one might imagine. When she 
left the home, she and her husband lost the value of the untaxed imputed income from her 
home production. See infra part IV. 
8. The Board, on several occasions, spoke generally of child care expenses and con-
clusorily determined that the expenses were personal, e.g., "We are not prepared to say that 
the care of children, like similar aspects of family and household life, is other than a per-
sonal concern." Smith v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. at 1039. The expenses "are nevertheless per-
sonal in their nature of a character applicable to human beings generally, ... and exist on 
that plane regardless of the occupation ... of the individuals concerned." Id. at 1039-40. 
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larly persuasive, its holding made clear that no deduction for child 
care expenses would be allowed unless specific statutory authority 
for such a deduction were enacted. 9 
B. SECTION 214-LIMITED DEDUCTION FOR CHILD CARE 
EXPENSES 
In 1954, Congress partially overruled Smith by enacting sec-
tion 214 providing limited deductibility for child care expendi-
tures. Specifically, it allowed up to a $600 itemized deduction for 
child care expenses, if the expenses were made to enable the par-
ent to be gainfully employed. In 1964, Congress increased the max-
imum deduction to $900 if there were two or more dependents.10 
Dependent was defined as a child under the age of 13 or any other 
dependent of the taxpayer who was unable to take care of himself 
or herself. 11 In two-parent households, the expenses incurred could 
only be deducted if they enabled a second spouse to enter the 
workforce. 12 
In addition, the old section 214 employed an income phase-out 
and ceiling for married couples. Beginning at $4,500 in 1954 and 
$6000 after 1964, the deductible amount was reduced dollar for 
dollar for each dollar of combined adjusted gross income.13 Inter-
estingly, single mothers14 were not subject to the income phase-out 
and ceiling provisions. They could take advantage of the full de-
duction regardless of their income. Finally, section 214 disallowed 
any deduction for a single male caretaker unless he was a 
widower. 111 
9. Although Smith's holding was indeed clear, that did not stop taxpayers from bring-
ing other lawsuits raising the same issue in the context of substantially identical fact situa-
tions. See, e.g., LOrenz v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. 720 (1949); O'Connor v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 323 
(1946). 
10. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212(a), 78 Stat. 19, 49 (codified as I.R.C. § 214(b)(l)(B)) 
(repealed in 1971). 
11. This was intended to cover disabled, mentally retarded and chronically ill 
individuals. 
12. I.R.C. § 214(a),(b)(2) (1964). A working woman who incurred child care expenses 
while her husband was "incapable of self-support" because "mentally or physically defec-
tive" could still claim the deduction. ld. 
13. I.R.C. §§ 214(b)(2) (1954); 214(b)(2) (1964). Since the income phase-out worked on 
a dollar-for-dollar basis, the 1964 ceiling was hit at $6,600 when the family had one qualify-
ing "individual" and $6,900 when the family had two or more "dependents." 
14. Widowers also were not subject to the income phase-out and ceiling. ld. 
15. I.R.C. § 214(a)(l964). This section was held to be an unconstitutional denial of the 
equal protection guarantee implicit in the fifth amendment due process clause. Moritz v. 
Comm'r, 469 F.2d 466 (lOth Cir. 1972), rev'g 55 T.C. 113 (1970). By the time the lOth Cir-
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At first glance, the old section 214 might be viewed as an ac-
ceptance of the taxpayer's position in Smith. Since the provision is 
structured as a deduction, it is reasonable to assume that qualify-
ing child care expenditures were considered to be true costs of go-
ing to work. That being the case, the deduction would properly 
offset taxes at the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. However, the fact 
that the statute included phase-out and ceiling amounts indicates 
that the business deduction concept was abandoned for higher in-
come taxpayers. If the deduction was seen as a cost of doing the 
business of being employed, it is difficult to see why taxpayers with 
incomes above $6,900 should be denied such a deduction. They, 
too, must incur child care expenses when they enter the labor mar-
ket. Moreover, the business deduction explanation breaks down on 
the lower end of the income spectrum as well. By making section 
214 an itemized deduction, Congress denied a deduction for em-
ployment-related child care to a very large proportion of low and 
middle income taxpayers. Finally, even if we assume that in 1954 
$600 was a proper estimate of the annual cost of care for one child, 
nine hundred dollars could not have covered the cost of care for 
two, let alone three or more, children. 16 
Since the old section 214 was not structured as a business ex-
pense, it was probably seen by Congress as a tax subsidy or hard-
ship provision. This is indicated by the presence of the income 
phase-out and ceiling. However, if it was meant as a hardship pro-
vision it certainly failed. First, it ignored those taxpayers most in 
need by only allowing the deduction to itemizers. Second, by virtue 
of the graduated tax rates the deduction, as opposed to a tax credit 
or a direct subsidy targeted to low- and middle-income parents, 
gave a relatively greater benefit to those whose incomes came clos-
est to the phase-out amount. 
In effect, then, the old section 214 combined certain aspects of 
a tax subsidy and a business expense deduction in an incoherent 
manner. The result was an expensing of child care costs for a small 
proportion of middle-income taxpayers. In addition, Congress' de-
cision to disallow the deduction for single fathers, and to disregard 
the income limitations for single mothers, was, when read in con-
cuit decided Moritz, the statute had already been changed to cure the constitutional defect. 
Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 210, 85 Stat. 497, 518. See also Note, Sex and the Single Man: Dis-
crimination in the Dependent Care Deduction, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 415 (1971). 
16. By the time the old § 214 was overhauled in 1971, $600 per year was well below the 
average cost of child care in this country. S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 60, re-
printed in 1971 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. NEws 1918, 1967. 
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junction with the entire section, inconsistent with either a notion 
of business deduction or subsidy. Those provisions can only be ex-
plained as expressions of social ideals regarding child rearing and 
family life. 17 
C. THE NEW SECTION 214-EXPANDED DEDUCTION FOR 
CHILD CARE EXPENSES 
In 1971, Congress rewrote section 214, providing for the first 
time a large deduction to a fairly wide range of taxpayers.18 The 
amounts allowed as deductible expenses increased dramatically. If 
child care was provided in the home, a family was allowed to de-
duct up to $400 per month regardless of the number of children in 
the household. 19 For child care outside of the home, most likely 
purchased from a day care center, a deduction for one qualifying 
individual of up to $200 per month was allowed; for two and three 
qualifying individuals the maximum amounts allowed were $300 
and $400 per month, respectively. Thus, an otherwise eligible tax-
payer could deduct up to $4800 per year. The section retained an 
income phase-out and ceiling, but they were greatly in excess of 
those allowed by old section 214. The phase-out began at $18,000 
and was reduced by one-half the excess of adjusted gross income 
over $18,000, resulting in a ceiling of $27,600. Moreover, the phase-
out and ceiling amounts were increased in 1975 to $35,000 and 
$44,600, respectively. 20 
Qualifying individual in the new section 214 was defined some-
what differently than it had been in the past. Disabled adult de-
pendents were still included, as were dependent children, but the 
maximum age of a child for whom expenses were deductible was 
raised to 15. In addition, married couples could take deductions if 
only one spouse worked, provided that the other spouse was dis-
abled or otherwise unable to take care of the children. 21 
17. See generally infra part V. 
18. Sec. 210(a) of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 518 (re-
pealed in 1976). 
19. I.R.C. § 214(c)(1) (1971). Section 214 allowed the deduction of employment-related 
expenses including not only child care costs, but ancillary household services as well. I.R.C. 
§ 214(b)(2)(1971) (repealed in 1976). 
20. Section 206 of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26, 32 
(repealed 1976). 
21. Old § 214 had been amended in 1964 to allow deductions "in the case of a [work-
ing] woman who is married [for such child care] expenses incurred while her husband is 
incapable of self-support." Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 212(a), 78 Stat. 18, 49. 
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Finally, the new provision made all taxpayers, married and 
unmarried, sz subject to the income phase-out and ceiling, and gave 
single fathers parity with single mothers by allowing them to take 
full advantage of deductibility.23 
In spite of its major changes, section 214 still did not evoke a 
uniform rationale for its adoption. It failed to choose between busi-
ness deduction and subsidy, between refinement of income and 
hardship provision. The legislative history suggests that Congress 
saw the new child care provision as a departure from the income 
tax base which was specifically enacted to encourage economic 
growth. As the Senate Finance Committee put it: 
[T]he bill provide[s] a new job development deduction which is 
designed to encourage the employment of individuals in child care 
and domestic service and to relieve hardship in certain cases where 
substantial extra expenses are incurred for such purposes .... [l]t 
provides a substantial incentive for the employment of qualified in-
dividuals in household service. Accordingly, it can be expected to 
give large numbers of individuals who are now receiving public assis-
tance the opportunity to perform socially desirable services which 
are vitally needed. At the same time, it will help to remove these 
individuals from the welfare rolls and reduce the cost of providing 
public assistance." 
Section 214 hardly seems to be the proper mechanism to 
achieve the Committee's objectives. First, the new provision, like 
its predecessor, could only be used by itemizers. If "hardship in 
certain cases" was Congress' primary concern, the scheme enacted 
would bypass those most in need by excluding nonitemizers.211 Sec-
ond, the measure could not have fulfilled its goal of being a hard-
ship provision because it was structured as a deduction which pro-
vides relatively greater benefit as the marginal tax rate increases. 
Finally, if one of section 214's aims was to increase employment of 
domestics, lower income nonitemizers should have been targeted 
for the deduction in addition to the moderate income itemizers, 
because the latter were more likely to have been employing domes-
tics already. 
The legislative history also reveals the continuing belief that 
22. See supra text accompanying notes 14 and 17. 
23. Compare supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
24. S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
An. NEWS 1918, 1929. 
25. Of course, those most in need are those who owe no federal taxes by virtue of their 
poverty. See infra text accompanying notes 35-36 (regarding refundable child care credit). 
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child care expenses (when incurred to enable a parent to enter the 
workforce) are business expenses, and should be deductible on the 
ground that their exclusion from the tax base is a better indication 
of the individual's net income or ability to consume.28 The arbi-
trary income limitations imposed by the new section 214, however, 
made it a poor business deduction model. It also failed as a busi-
ness expense at the other end of the income spectrum by not in-
cluding nonitemizers. This result could not reasonably be ex-
plained on the grounds that the greatly increased amount of child 
care expenses allowed by new section 214 was already subsumed 
within the standard deduction. 
The new section 214 made the same mistakes as did its prede-
cessor; it failed to decide what type of provision it wanted to be. If 
the Congress wanted to enact a hardship provision, it certainly 
failed by leaving out those most in need and skewing the assistance 
which it did provide to taxpayers with relatively higher incomes. 
On the other hand, if Congress wanted to extract child care ex-
penses from the tax base as a refinement of income for working 
parents, it did so in a remarkably underinclusive manner by focus-
ing on a relatively small group of middle-income taxpayers. 
Nevertheless, by increasing the maximum all<,>wable deduction 
from $900 per year to $4800 per year, Congress took a significant 
step in expanding the child care provision and making it possible 
for second earners and single heads of households to obtain gainful 
employment outside the home. 
D. SECTION 44A-THE CHILD CARE CREDIT 
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, section 214 was re-
pealed and replaced by section 44A, a credit for household and de-
pendent care services. 27 With section 44A, Congress, for the first 
time, fully embraced the notion of a subsidy or hardship provision. 
As the Senate Finance Committee stated: 
The committee believes that the availability of the child and depen-
dent care deduction under present law (sec. 214) is unduly restricted 
by its classification as an itemized deduction .... 
26. S. REP. No. 437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
AD. NEWS 1918, 1966 ("the adult members of the family are employed full time and in this 
sense the domestic help expenses can to some extent be likened to an employee business 
expense"). 
27. Sec. 504(a) (1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 
1562. 
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Treating child care expenses as itemized deductions denies any 
beneficial tax recognition of such expenses to taxpayers who elect 
the standard deduction. The committee believes that such expenses 
should be viewed as a cost of earning income for which all working 
taxpayers may make a claim. One method for extending the allow-
ance of child care expenses to all taxpayers, and not just itemizers, 
would be to replace the itemized deduction with a credit against in-
come tax liability for a percentage of qualified expenses. While de-
ductions favor taxpayers in the higher marginal tax brackets, a tax 
credit provides more help for taxpayers in lower brackets.18 
As implied in the above quote, section 44A enacted a credit 
available to all qualifying parents, nonitemizers as well as 
itemizers. It eliminated the income ceiling and the previously rec-
ognized distinction between child care provided in the home and 
child care provided in a day care center.19 It also permitted certain 
married students to qualify as employed persons for the purposes 
of the credit.30 
Originally, section 44A allowed a 20 percent credit for up to 
$2,000 in child care expenses per year for one qualifying individ-
ual31 and $4,000 per year for two or more qualifying individuals. In 
1981, Congress raised these amounts to $2,400 and $4,800, respec-
tively, because of substantial increases in employment related ex-
penses. 32 In addition, in 1981, the section 44A fiat credit of 20 per-
cent was changed to a reverse graduated credit beginning at 30 
percent for taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 or 
less and bottoming out at 20 percent for taxpayers with adjusted 
gross incomes of over $28,000.33 With this alteration, Congress 
more explicitly moved toward a subsidy of low income parents. 
The chart below, correlating the maximum credit benefit with in-
come level, is illustrative:34 
28. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. ConE CoNG. & 
An. NEws 3439, 3565. 
29. Compare supra text accompanying notes 19-20 with I.R.C. § 44A(d). The 1981 
amendments to § 44A require that payments made to a day care center can be credited only 
if "such center complies with all applicable laws and regulations of a state or unit of local 
government .... " Sec. 124(d) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 
95 Stat. 172, 198 (codified as I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2)(C). 
30. See I.R.C. §§ 44A(c)(2)(A), 44A(e)(2). 
31. The term "qualifying individual" was defined as it was in the old § 214. See supra 
text accompanying note 21. 
32. H. R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1981). 
33. Sec. 124(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 
172, 198 (codified as I.R.C. § 44A(a)(2)). 
34. The chart is reproduced from STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 11523.1.05 (1983). 
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Adjusted Gross 
Income 
Up to 10,000 
$10,001-12,000 
12,001-14,000 
14,001-16,000 
16,001-18,000 
18,001-20,000 
20,001-22,000 
22,001-24,000 
24,001-26,000 
26,001-28,000 
28,001 and over 
Applicable 
Percentage 
30% 
29% 
28% 
27% 
26% 
25% 
24% 
23% 
22% 
21% 
20% 
Maximum Credits 
One 
Qualifying 
Individual 
$720 
696 
672 
648 
624 
600 
576 
552 
528 
504 
480 
Two or More 
Qualifying 
Individuals 
$1,440 
1,392 
1,344 
1,296 
1,248 
1,200 
1,152 
1,104 
1,056 
1,008 
960 
Under present law, the child care credit still does not benefit 
society's poorest parents because it can only be used to offset taxes 
otherwise owed; in other words, it is not refundable. Senator Ken-
nedy proposed a refundable credit when the enactment of section 
44A was originally considered. His proposal was passed by a large 
margin in the Senate (71-21), but it was rejected by the Conference 
Committee.311 A refundability proposal met the same fate in 1981.38 
Without refundability, however, section 44A cannot carry out fully 
the purpose implicit in the reverse graduated credit-to extend the 
bulk of the benefits to those most in need. 
Nevertheless, section 44A represents the first time Congress 
has enacted a child care provision which is seemingly consistent 
with its stated purpose. The 1976 enactment envisioned a certain 
amount of child care as socially desirable and fashioned a credit to 
subsidize all qualifying taxpayers for a part of that amount. In 
1981, Congress extended the subsidy even further to low-income 
taxpayers by granting them a tax credit for a greater percentage of 
their child care expenditures .. 
E. SECTION 129-DEPENDENT CARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
In 1981, as part of ERTA, Congress enacted section 129 which 
provides for dependent care assistance programs. 37 A dependent 
35. 122 CoNG. REc. 23117 (1976); H.R. CoNF. REP. 1515, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 432, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4118, 4141. 
36. H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01, reprinted in U.S.CoDE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 105, 290-91. 
37. Sections 124(e) and (0 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
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care assistance program must be embodied in a "written plan of an 
employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees to provide such 
employees with dependent care assistance."38 
If the dependent care assistance program satisfies the require-
ments of section 129, an eligible employee may exclude from gross 
income the amount of dependent care assistance purchased by the 
employer on the employee's behalf. 89 Dependent care assistance is 
defined as "services which if paid for by the employee would be 
considered employment-related expenses under section 
44A(c)(2)."40 Therefore, dependent care expenses incurred to en-
able the taxpayer to be gainfully employed are excludable. The de-
pendent care can be provided in the home or in a day care center.41 
Unlike section 44A, there are no absolute limits on the amount of 
dependent care expenditures which can be taken into account,42 
but the excluded amount cannot exceed the earned income of the 
taxpayer or in the case of a married couple, the earned income of 
the lower earning spouse. 48 
An employer must make the plan available to its employees on 
a nondiscriminatory basis by not favoring "employees who are of-
ficers, owners or highly compensated."•• In addition, "[r]easonable 
notification of the availability and terms of the program shall be 
provided to eligible employees."411 Finally, a self-employed person 
can be considered his or her own employer, and a partnership can 
34, 95 Stat. 172, 199. 
38. I.R.C. § 129(d)(1) (1983). 
39. I.R.C. § 129(a)(1983). 
40. I.R.C. § 129(e)(1) (1983). 
41. I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2) (1983). 
42. Compare I.R.C. § 44A with I.R.C. § 129. 
43. I.R.C. § 129(b)(1). Earned income, as defined in I.R.C. § 43(c)(2), does not include 
for the purposes of § 129 amounts incurred by an employer in providing dependent care 
assistance to an employee. Section 44A also has an· earned income limitation in addition to 
the absolute limitations on the amounts to which the credit may be applied. See I.R.C. § 
44A(e). 
44. I.R.C. § 129(d)(2). The nondiscrimination clause was modified by Pub. L. No. 97-
448, § 10l(e)(1)(A), 96 Stat. 2365, 2367. However, discrimination will not result from exclud-
ing "employees not included in a program who are included in a unit of employees covered 
by an agreement which the Secretary of Labor finds to be a collective bargaining agreement 
between employee representatives and one or more employers, if there is evidence that de-
pendent care benefits were the subject of good faith bargaining between such employee rep-
resentatives and such employer or employers." I.R.C. § 129(d)(3)(1983). See also I.R.C. § 
129(d)(4) (Amounts paid to employees who are large corporate stockholders or owners can-
not exceed 25% of the total amounts paid or incurred by the employer in any year). 
45. I.R.C. § 129(d)(6). 
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be considered as the employer of working partners.48 
Section 129 seems to do what section 44A does not-it allows 
the taxpayer to treat dependent care expenses as a business deduc-
tion. For example, a two-earner family earning $20,200 per year 
with $4,400 in child care expenses excluded pursuant to a section 
129 plan receives the same tax benefit as it would earning $24,600 
in otherwise taxable income with a deduction for $4,400 of child 
care costs.47 Very significantly though, an exclusion benefits all 
nonitemizers and itemizers in full because it operates without re-
gard to the zero bracket amount. By allowing all eligible parents to 
effectively expense their child care outlays, section 129 embodies 
the ideal of business deduction to a much greater degree than did 
the section 214 deduction with its income ceiling and bar against 
nonitemizers. 48 
However, section 129 poses two problems. First, by allowing a 
deduction limited only by the earning power of the taxpayer-par-
ent,49 the government has created the potential for deductions 
which are purely personal in character. For example, a working 
couple has a combined income of $40,000 per year, split roughly 
equally between husband and wife. Their two preschoolers need 
child care and, therefore, the couple investigates the local day care 
center which they discover costs $4800 per year for two children. 
The day care center complies with all state and local health and 
safety regulations. It provides continuous supervision and organ-
ized group activities in safe and pleasant, but not extravagant, sur-
roundings. The children eat a lunch at the center which they bring 
with them each morning. The center does provide a small 
midmorning snack every day. 
The couple considers the day care center, but decides that it 
simply is not good enough for their children. Instead, they hire a 
46. I.R.C. § 129(e)(3) and (4). 
47. The tax rate for married individuals filing joint returns for taxable incomes over 
$20,200, but not exceeding $24,600, is 23%. I.R.C. § 1(a)(2). Therefore, the tax savings for 
the family in my hypothetical would be $1,012 ($4,400 x .23). I have simplified the hypothet-
ical by making the couple's gross income equal to their tax table income. In reality, the 
couple would have taken at least four exemptions and probably other deductions and 
credits. 
48. Of course, any deduction or exclusion benefits the taxpayer only to the extent to 
which it iS used against or exempts otherwise taxable income. If a single taxpayer earned 
$2,000 in a year all of which was excludable as a fellowship under I.R.C. § 117, the taxpayer 
would not receive any tax benefit because $2,000 in income is effectively taxed at zero 
percent. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
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nursemaid to come to their home every weekday for eight to ten 
hours. The nursemaid dresses the children each morning, cooks 
and feeds them lunch, and otherwise keeps them occupied by tak-
ing them to visit neighborhood children and to the local park. The 
nursemaid demands a $11,000 salary. 
The mother is a partner in an accounting firm. The partner-
ship reduces her $20,000 salary to $9,000, and pays the $11,000 sal-
ary directly to the nursemaid on a periodic basis pursuant to its 
section 129 dependent care assistance program.110 
50. Indeed, there is no need for the partnership to pay the nursemaid. The partner-
ship can simply create a "reimbursement account." The partner can pay the nursemaid, 
submit evidence of such payment to the partnership (cancelled check or the like), and be 
reimbursed by the partnership for the proper amount. The reimbursed amounts will be ex-
cluded from the partner's income. Large companies follow the same procedures for their 
employees. Waldholz, 'Cafeteria' Benefits Plants Let Employees Fill Their Plates, Then 
Pay With Tax-Free Dollars, Wall. St. J., May 9, 1983, at 58, col. 1 ("During the year he will 
submit bills from his housekeeper and be paid out of the company's child care reimburse-
ment account."). Although the child care expenses will not appear on the taxpayer's W-2 
form, the employer is required by January 31 to submit a statement to the employee show-
ing the amounts incurred for child care expenses for the prior year. I.R.C. § 129(d)(7). The 
Service has the right to demand a copy of the statement from the employer. STAFF OF THE 
JT. CoMM. oN TAx'N, 97TH CoNG., 1sT SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION oF THE EcoNoMic RE-
coVERY TAx ACT OF 1981 at 55, reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS 1980-81 (West) 1369, 
1430. 
Recently, the Service has attacked the use of reimbursement plans under § 129 and, 
more generally, under § 125 (cafeteria plans) which had been interpreted to allow exclusion 
for a host of benefits, e.g., health care, prepaid legal services, in addition to child care. See 
generally, Waldholz, supra. 
On February 10, 1984, the Service issued an announcement retroactively invalidating 
most reimbursement plans, i.e., those which allowed periodic reimbursement for benefits as 
expended and a gross determination of tax exludability at year's end. m 84-22 (Feb. 10, 
1984), 1984 FED. TAXES(P-H) 11 54,902. 
The only plans which the Service found legal were those "in which the employee can 
make a one-time election before the beginning of the year between cash and eligibility for 
reimbursement of certain expenses ... up to a stated amount." Id. Thus, if an employee 
overestimates his or her child care expenditures, he or she would simply lose the excess 
allocated to child care which might otherwise be paid out as salary. If an employee underes-
timates the cost of child care, the excess necessary to provide such child care must be paid 
out of after-tax dollars. Thus, the Service interpretation invoked the notion that only those 
dollars at risk (based upon a prior estimate of expenses) should be excludable. It is difficult 
to see how the Service derived such an interpretation from either § 129 or § 125. Moreover, 
the at risk concept simply does not inform a policy judgment of how much child care (or 
other) costs should go untaxed, but rather forces the employee into a pre-expenditure guess-
ing game regarding the cost of certain services. For instance, if the cost of child care were to 
unexpectedly double in a particular year, the affected employee would have guessed wrong, 
and would thus lose tax benefits clearly provided for in § 129. 
In any event, the Service announcement, which promised regulations in the near future, 
raised "questions about the validity of all but the most conservatively drawn flexible com-
pensation arrangements." DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 30, at G-2 (Feb. 14, 1984). Reaction 
was swift and negative from the lawyers of large corporations making use of such plans and 
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Assuming that the $4,800 day care center provides services 
which would have enabled the taxpayer to be gainfully employed,&1 
then the additional $6,200 spent by the couple can only be viewed 
as consumption. Of course, whether such expenditures would be 
excludable depends on the quality and quantity of dependent care 
services which are seen as necessary to enable the taxpayer to be 
gainfully employed. The Tax. Court and the Service have inter-
preted this standard quite liberally.&2 Moreover, section 44A(c)(2), 
which creates the standard to which section 129 must look, specifi-
cally permits the taxpayer to include household services as an ex-
pense when such services are performed in conjunction with child 
care. Therefore, it is extremely likely that the couple in the above 
hypothetical would be allowed the full $11,000 exclusion even 
though less than half of that amount can be viewed as a business 
expense. 
Second, section 129 excludes taxpayers whose employers do 
not adopt a plan from partaking of its benefits. For employers, 
amounts incurred under section 129 are considered employee com-
of wealthy individuals benefiting from such plans, especially with regard to the Service's 
decision to apply its interpretation retroactively to the original effective date of § 125, Janu-
ary 1, 1979. See Lublin, IRS Provokes Uproar by Attacking Corporation 'Reimbursement' 
Plans, Wall St. J., March 20, 1984, at 35, col. 4; Klott, 'Cafeteria' Plans Face I.R.S. Curb, 
N.Y. Times, May 4, 1984, at D-1, col. 1. 
Shortly thereafter, Representative Barber Conable (R-NY) proposed a legislative 
change, basically adopting the Service's stance, but elinlinating retroactivity. All reimburse-
ment plans existing on or before January 1, 1984, would be valid. In addition, the Conable 
proposal would establish exclusion linlits under section 129 of $2400 applied to one child 
and $4800 applied to two or more children. Thus, the maximum amounts excludable would 
track the limits under the § 44A credit. See DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 83, at G-3, J-1 
(April 30, 1984). 
On May 7, 1984, the Service issued proposed regulations which basically confirm its 
February 10, 1984 announcement, though there is some narrow relief from retroactivity. 49 
Fed. Reg. 19,321-28 (May 7, 1984). For an excellent description and analysis of the proposed 
regulations see 23 TAX NOTES 743, (May 14, 1984). 
Regardless of whether or not the Service's interpretation is justified, the outcry after its 
announcement makes clear the economic interest that individuals and corporate employers 
have in continuing the tax-exempt status of the significant employee expenditures covered 
by § 129 and related provisions. 
As this Article goes to press, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 has been signed by President 
Reagan. A generous transition rule in the Act eliminates retroactivity,§ 531(b), Pub. L. No. 
98-369. 
51. See I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2). This is the standard set out in the § 44A child care provi-
sion. However, § 129 specifically invokes the § 44A standard. I.R.C. § 129(e)(1). 
52. Brown v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 156 (1979) (food and lodging components of boarding 
school expense deductible where parent said she could not be employed if her son did not 
attend the school); Rev. Rul. 76-288, 1976-2 C.B. 83 (out-of-pocket expenditures for house-
keeper's meals and lodging qualify as child and dependent care expenses). 
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pensation deductible under section 162.113 Therefore, when incurred 
in the form of a salary reduction, the cost to employers of depen-
den~ care assistance programs will consist solely of the administra-
tive overhead of devising and maintaining a plan. Plans likely will 
be adopted by large companies which can afford to absorb such 
costs114 and want to use the plans to attract employees.1111 Self-em-
ployed taxpayers can adopt their own plans and thereby deduct, as 
employers, and exclude, as employees, expenses incurred for de-
pendent care.118 Section 129, by requiring employer plans as a con-
duit for child care deductions, will tend to exclude taxpayers who 
work for small and middle-sized firms which do not find it 
financially feasible to adopt such plans. 
Therefore, while section 129 appears on the surface to achieve 
perfect excludability for employment-related child care expenses 
and thus give such expenses business deduction status, it is in fact 
both overinclusive and underinclusive. By failing to put a limit on 
the amount excludable, it permits personal expenses for the chil-
dren of the well-to-do to go untaxed; by not extending the exclu-
sion to all working parents who incur child care costs, it discrimi-
nates arbitrarily in favor of those whose employers adopt a 
dependent care assistance plan. 
III. CHILD CARE ExPENSEs: BusiNESs OR PERSONAL 
In part II, I discussed the various child care provisions of the 
Code in light of the fundamental assumption that business ex-
penses should be excluded from the tax base. This assumption, 
embodied in section 162, is based on the notion that the taxpaying 
unit should be taxed on net income, i.e., its ability to consume.117 
53. STAFF OF THE JT. CoMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CoNG. 1sT SEss., GENERAL ExPLANATION OF 
THE EcoNOMIC REcoVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 55, reprinted in INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS 
1980-81 (West) 1369, 1430. 
54. See Waldholz, supra note 50 (for large companies the start-up costs for benefits 
plans can be very high); but see Brudney, Local Groups Make Strides Toward Better Child 
Care, Boston Globe, Jan. 30, 1983, at 73, col. 1 (Child Care Law Center has prepared a 
pamphlet explaining an easy-to-adopt model plan pursuant to § 129). 
55. See Waldholz supra note 50 ("The idea [according to the vice president of a Pitts-
burgh bank] is to keep the bank competitive with other employers."). 
56. I.R.C. § 129(e)(3) and (4). But the requirement that no more than 25% of the 
payments be made to owners or 5% shareholders will often limit the benefits available to 
self-employed individuals. I.R.C. § 129(d)(4). 
57. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ... "); 
see also I.R.C. § 212 (individuals "allowed ... a deduction [for] all ordinary and necessary 
business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production of income .. 
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I have argued that the Congressional enactments regarding 
employment-related child care have failed to embrace fully the 
concept of business deduction or tax subsidy, although the legisla-
tive histories have given lip service to both.t~8 Indeed, if such ex-
penses were viewed as completely consistent with the business ex-
pense concept, the Congress would have enacted a child care 
deduction available to all working taxpayers. The deduction would 
be allowed up to the taxpayer's actual expenses, but not to exceed 
an amount reasonably calculated to enable the taxpayer to be gain-
fully employed.119 
This part will discuss whether child care expenses can prop-
erly be classified as business expenses which should be deductible 
or as personal expenses, deductible, if at all, only under a hardship 
theory. 
Politicians and commentators have argued that child care ex-
penses should be treated in the same manner as other business de-
ductions. Senator Tunney introduced a bill in 197560 which called 
for such treatment. He supported the measure by drawing the fol-
lowing analogy: 
."). 
[I]f John D. Rockefeller needed to hire a new secretary in order to 
be able to utilize his time more effectively in his work, he would be 
able to obtain a business expense under present Federal tax laws. If, 
on the other hand, a mother wants to go out and earn some money . 
. . and she wants to hire somebody to help care for her home and 
help look after her children, she is not able to claim such a salary 
cost as a business expense. It really is not fair to grant relief to the 
business man to hire a secretary and at the same time not grant the 
same relief to the mother who wants to work.61 
One commentator has specifically decried the Code's prior in-
58. Even the legislative history of the § 44A credit speaks in "business expense" lan-
guage: "The committee believes that such expenses should be viewed as a cost of earning 
income for which all working taxpayers may make a claim." S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 132, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 3439, 3565; see supra text accom-
panying note 28. 
59. I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2)(A). 
60. S. 1171, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Senator Tunney had introduced two similar 
bills which had passed the Senate in 1971 (74-1) and 1972 (71-8), but had died in the Con-
ference Committee. H. CoNF. REP. No. 708, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1971 U.S. 
CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2053, 2062. See Comment - Section 504 of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976: The New Credit for Child Care Expenses, 30 TAX LAW. 456, 465 n. 55. 
61. 117 Cong. Rec. 41252 (Nov. 15, 1971) (Statement by Senator Tunney in support of 
his 1971 bill); see supra note 60. 
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sistence on income limitations, and the continuing presence of an 
expense cap in the child care provision. 62 
If, however, child care expenses are viewed as a cost of earning 
income, a deduction of simply the total expenses from gross income 
is the more equitable approach 
... Only a Section 162 deduction from gross income makes it at all 
feasible, as an economic matter, for a mother in the upper tax 
brackets to work outside her home. 63 
Another writer has defended a child care deduction on busi-
ness expense grounds and included an attack on the notion of the 
child care deduction as subsidy: 
The Code does not require that a businessman show that he is eco-
nomically constrained to pursue his business as a prerequisite for 
deduction of business expenses. Our society does not encourage indi-
viduals or families to view mere subsistence as an economic goal . 
. . . While ... consideration for the poor is commendable it is beside 
.... the point .... A proper analysis of child care deductions should 
not focus on hardship; it should not even refer to it. 64 
On the other hand, other commentators have argued that a 
child care deduction erodes the tax base in providing for an essen-
tially personal tax benefit. 66 The Office of Management and 
Budget has seemingly accepted this line of argument, as it has 
classified the child care credit as a tax expenditure.66 Still other 
commentators have rejected the tax expenditure analyses as ap-
plied to child care. 67 
62. This commentator would probably be quite pleased with the disregard of an ex-
pense limitation in § 129. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53. 
63. Comment, supra note 60, at 466, 467, 468. 
64. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 71, 77. In fairness to Blumberg, she does believe that 
poor working mothers should be helped also. "Direct subsidy is necessary. At the very mini-
mum [the poor] should receive a 'refund' to the extent that they are unable to benefit from 
the deduction." Id. at 76. She would also insist on making a deduction available to 
nonitemizers. Id. at 77. 
65. See, e.g., Shreiber and Yoran, Child Care Expenses: A Proposal for a More Equi-
table and Efficient Tax Treatment, 54 TAXES 345 (1976); Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child 
Care: Sec. 210 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 50 TAXES 133 (1972); Keane, Federal Income 
Tax Treatment of Child Care Expenses, 10 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1972). 
66. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL 
ANALYSES-BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT FisCAL YEAR 1984 at G-27 (child 
care credit: $1.83 billion in fiscal year 1982). 
67.For a criticism of tax expenditure analysis in certain instances see Andrews, Per-
sonal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REv. 309 (1972). Andrews briefly 
rejects tax expenditure analysis with respect to child care expenses of working parents. I d. 
at 382. Cf. generally Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Re-
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It is my view that employment-related child care expenses 
cannot be forced into either a business or personal category. It is 
easy enough to reject a pure tax expenditure contention. A single 
parent, for example, must by law provide care for his or her young 
child if he or she wants to maintain employment outside the home. 
It is an expenditure resulting from the decision to enter the 
workforce which did not exist before that decision. Therefore, a 
deduction would arguably provide a refinement of the single par-
ent's income. The prototypical tax expenditure, say, the municipal 
bond interest exclusion, never refines income, it hides income. 
Should child care on the other hand, be seen as a pure busi-
ness expense? First, it must be distinguished from the section 162 
ordinary and necessary business expense. Although proponents of 
the business expense argument like to compare working parents' 
child care costs with those of business people, the latter are more 
businesslike because they are of a type which generally never arise 
in a personal context.68 Typical section 162 expenses such as 
wages, rental of business premises and the like should usually be 
deductible no matter how imprudently incurred because those who 
incur them are not consuming thereby. 
On the other hand, while child care expenses can be seen as 
employment-related when they provide the child with safe and 
proper care, it is difficult to justify deductibility for extravagant 
child pampering as necessary (in the section 162 sense) to the par-
ent's employment.69 Thus, the claim that "cost should not be an 
issue at all"70 with regard to child care is without merit. 
Second, even assuming that the child care deduction provision 
contains an expense ceiling, it can be argued that employment-re-
lated child care expenses are not entirely a cost of doing business. 
In the case where a two-parent family has been purchasing child 
form, 80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) (tax expenditure analysis insufficient device to achieve 
comprehensive tax base; reform must be achieved on a provision-by-provision analysis). 
68. The major exceptions are travel and entertainment expenses and business lunches 
which have large personal components. Examples of other borderline business purchases 
would be the building of an executive lunchroom, the purchase of plush carpeting for the 
law firm, etc. While these items may ostensibly be purchased to impress clients, they also 
provide comfort for those who work in the business environment. Although, the Code has 
drawn. a line between the workplace as business and the home as personal for reasons of 
administrative convenience, it is easy to see that certain items are mixed in nature. In spite 
of the administrative convenience argument, it is clear that certain class biases play a role 
when one takes account of the types of items which fall on the business side of the business/ 
personal borderline. 
69. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53. 
70. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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care services even though one spouse does not work outside the 
home, it is clear when that spouse decides to enter the marketplace 
that the continuing child care expenses were not incurred to enable 
him or her to engage in gainful employment. On the other hand, it 
is still true that the couple must purchase child care so long as 
they work even if they would no longer purchase child care if not 
required by their employment. The fact that the child care ex-
penses were not originally incurred to enable the second spouse to 
work is insufficient reason to classify such expenses as forever non-
earnings-related. It is simply impossible in this situation to ascer-
tain whether the expenses are business or personal. 
Moreover, how would the Service effectively deny deductions 
to working parents who purchased child care services without re-
gard to their market employment? The regulations under section 
44A state: "An expense is not considered to be employment-related 
merely because it is incurred while the taxpayer is gainfully em-
ployed. The purpose of the expense must be to enable the tax-
payer to be gainfully employed. "71 Despite this regulation there is 
no indication that the Service has tried to enforce such a policy.72 
Trying to delve into the purpose of taxpayers' child care expenses 
would be costly and fruitless. No objective test could be devised to 
divine people's reasons for purchasing care for their children. 
Therefore, if child care expenses are incurred, they must qualify 
for beneficial tax treatment even if they may not always enable the 
taxpayer to obtain gainful employment. However, Feld has argued 
that: 
[E]ven where the expense would not be incurred but for the oppor-
tunity to enter into gainful employment, the working wife is likely to 
receive personal gratification from the child care. Accordingly, at 
least in some degree, the expenditure does not represent a disincen-
tive to work but a means of obtaining personal gratification. In view 
of the inherent difficulty in determining what part of the expendi-
ture should be regarded as business related rather than personal, the 
tax base should not be further eroded by permitting a deduction.73 
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.44A-1(c)(1)(i) (1983) (emphasis added). 
72. There are no cases denying child care deductions or credits to families because 
they could have afforded, or did in fact purchase, child care services prior to gainful employ-
ment. See STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1l523J.2835 (1983). But cf. Semel v. Comm'r, 24 
T.C.M. 1176, 1189 (1965) (employed father sent $40 per week to ex-wife pursuant to a court 
order; held, father did not prove expenses enabled him to be gainfully employed and, in any 
event, he did not stipulate what part of the $40 was for child care within the meaning of § 
214). 
73. Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household Services, 27 TAX L. 
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Feld's personal gratification argument seems faulty. In what 
sense does child care serve as a means of obtaining personal gratifi-
cation? When, for instance, a second spouse leaves the home to 
take marketplace employment, it is often true that he or she has 
given up homemaking and child-rearing because those tasks are no 
longer, or never were, personally satisfying. However, even Feld 
suggests, the anxiety of leaving one's children in the care of stran-
gers might sometimes result in a net dissatisfaction for the 
parent.'" 
On the other hand, a business person may be very gratified 
when handing the first paycheck to an employee who he or she 
fought very hard to attract to the firm. Should we deny a deduc-
tion for all or part of the wages paid? A tax system cannot base 
itself on subjective assessments of satisfaction lest it be willing to 
award deductions for psychic depression and make positive assess-
ments of units of happiness. Such a task would be impossible. The 
Code seeks, instead, to distinguish personal or consumptive behav-
ior75 from behavior whose purpose is to produce income with which 
to consume.78 This distinction is not a clear one,77 and is often de-
liberately strayed from, but is ultimately one which must be sought 
if we want to tax ability to consume, not merely gross receipts.78 A 
REv. 415, 429 (1972). 
74. /d. at 426 ("Of course, the extent of the enjoyment derived from this service will 
vary among working mothers; indeed, for some· the anxiety of being concerned . about the 
welfare of the children ... will outweigh any satisfaction."). 
75. See I.R.C. § 262. The term "consumption" itself is very difficult to define. See 
generally Andrews, supra note 66 and especially at 355-56 where he rejects the concept of 
consumption as gratification with respect to the charitable deduction. But see Kelman, Per-
sonal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an 'Ideal' Income Tax and Why They 
Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 835-58 (1979). 
76. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. "Productive behavior" is an elusive term. How do we deter-
mine when the taxpayer is really trying to be productive? See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 183 (Hobby 
Losses) and 280A (Business use of Residences). See also Dreicer v. Comm'r, 665 F.2d 1292 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), holding that the objective to make a profit even without the expectation of 
making a profit will justify a deduction under § 183. 
77. Far from being clear, the distinction between business and personal life, like other 
public/private distinctions, is informed by our sense of the social universe which is con-
stantly changing and often murky and indeterminate. See generally, Kennedy, The Stages 
of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982). My exam-
ple involving the fast food entrepreneur, see infra text accompanying note 86, illustrates the 
difficulty of determining whether something is in fact business or personal, in spite of a 
superficial legal determination that it is clearly one way or the other. 
My point here, nevertheless, is that even if such determinations are difficult to make, 
they must be made if an income tax, rather than a gross receipts tax, is the objective. See 
infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
78. A gross receipts tax does not attempt to achieve vertical or horizontal equity as 
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discussion of a taxpayer gratification simply does not illuminate 
the problem. 
Blumberg poses a more interesting problem adverted to earlier 
in this paper.79 She claims that child care expenses are pure busi-
ness deductions because they would not be incurred absent gainful 
employment. 80 On one level her point is absolutely correct; if a par-
ent chooses to work in the home, no child care expenses need be 
incurred. When the parent leaves the home to take gainful employ-
ment, he or she must provide care or possibly face charges of crim-
inal neglect. Except in the instances in which friends and neigh-
bors take care of the child gratis, child care will be purchased. 
Blumberg claims that the origin of the expense is the parent's 
decision to obtain gainful employment, and therefore, business de-
duction treatment is appropriate. The so-called origin test ema-
nates from the case of United States v. Gilmore81 in which the 
Supreme Court denied the taxpayer a deduction for legal fees in-
curred in a divorce proceeding. Even though the taxpayer's laWYer 
was employed in order to protect the husband's business interests 
from the wife, the Court denied the deduction on the ground that 
the expense had its origin in a family, i.e. personal, relationship. 
The Gilmore rule is problematic. For example, a restauranteur, on 
the verge of divorce, finds out that her husband is publicizing false 
and derogatory information about the quality of food at her res-
taurant out of sheer hostility. Business drops markedly, and the 
restauranteur brings a libel action. Is the origin of her resulting 
legal fees in her marital relationship or in the desire to protect her 
business?82 The courts have had trouble answering questions like 
these, and have come to results, even in marital property cases, 
which seem to contradict Gilmore.88 
Nevertheless, commentators have praised Gilmore for "pre-
sent[ing] a satisfactory test for marking the borderline between 
'costs of living' and 'costs of earning a living.' "84 With this in 
those concepts are currently conceived. Cf. Andrews, supra note 66, at 335, where he states 
that personal consumption is a part of the tax base because it usually "provides an index of 
relative material well-being on the basis of which to distribute tax burdens." A gross re-
ceipts tax could not achieve this goal. · 
79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
80. Blumberg, supra note 5, at 65-66. 
81. 372 u.s. 39 (1963). 
82. Other intractable hypotheticals are posed in W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 329-30 (1979). 
83. See, e.g., Wild v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 706 (1964), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 4. 
84. Keane, supra note 65, at 32; see also Comment, The Child Care Deduction: Issues 
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mind, we turn back to Blumberg's contention that the decision to 
maintain employment is the origin of a parent's child care ex-
penses. That is not necessarily so. One could say, and some have 
strongly implied,8a that child care outlays originate in the decision 
to have a child. While not all decisions to have a child result in 
child care expenses, the argument goes, some . do, as a result of the 
intervening decision of the parent (or both parents in the case of 
an intact marriage) to seek gainful employment. The origin, none-
theless, is familial. A similar argument can be advanced regarding 
a typical business expense. Does the decision today to expand a 
chain of fast-food restaurants from fifty to one hundred stores 
originate in a business context or in the purely personal, egotistic 
desire formed many years ago to dominate the market and become 
the next Colonel Sanders?88 Of course, that may seem silly to us, 
but how much sillier is it than telling a low-income single parent 
with a six year-old child that he or she cannot have a child care 
deduction on the ground that it is not employment-related, but 
rather it arose out of a decision to bear the child nearly seven years 
ago? 
Questions like these are not susceptible to rigorous logical 
analyses. How far back we wish to travel on the causal chain,87 as 
with the doctrine of proximate causation in the law of torts, re-
flects our attitudes as to which events should be considered socially 
or economically significant. Where we find the origin of an em-
ployed parent's child care expenses is likely to reveal prevailing 
attitudes toward distinctions between work and family, earning 
and consuming, business and pleasure, in addition to society's con-
ceptions of the roles of women as workers, wives, mothers and 
Raised by Michael and Elizabeth Nammack and the Pending Amendment to Section 214, 
13 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REv. 270, 275-76 (1971). Keane claims that the origins test is most 
useful in determining whether the taxpayer's motivation was directed toward carrying on a 
business within § 162; since "the origin of the child care expense is [a] taxpayer's personal 
need or desire for employment, it is not a cost of doing busineas, but a preparatory cost." 
Keane, supra note 65, at 34. How helpful is such classificatory language in determining the 
proper treatment of employment-related child care costs? See infra text accompanying 
notes 87-88. It may suggest that deductibility should not be allowed under § 162, see Keane, 
supra at 35, but it does not seem to tell us how we should otherwise treat child care ex-
penses. Cf. I.R.C. § 195 ("Start-up Expenditures"); l.R.C. § 183 ("Hobby Losses"). 
85. See, e.g., Hjorth, supra note 65, at 139; Comment, supra note 84, at 275-76. 
86. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 73-78. 
87. Of course, going back to the decision to bear a child does not exhaust the possibili-
ties implicit in the "origins test," e.g., the decision not to have an abortion, the decision to 
have sex. 
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homemakers. 88 
IV. CHILD CARE AND THE IMPUTED INCOME OF HoME PRODUCTION 
It has been argued that deciding whether employment related 
child care expenses are business or personal is not important, in-
deed, not even relevant, because a deduction is required by "the 
paramount objective" of "neutrality between housework and wage 
work .... "89 
The idea here is that when a person engages in home produc-
tion he 'or she earns imputed income which goes untaxed under our 
tax system as currently structured. Because wages earned in the 
marketplace are taxed, the worker, all other things being equal, 
will be encouraged to take the paying job only if it pays the value 
of the previous home production plus enough to pay the taxes90 as 
well.91 
Person at Home 
Imputed Income From 
Home Production 
Tax 
Net Income 
Chart One 
(assuming 50% tax rate) 
20 
0 
20 
Wages 
Tax 
Person Goes to Work 
Net Income 
20 
10 
10 
Thus, the argument goes, if a marketplace worker replaces his 
or her home services with purchased services, he or she should be 
given a deduction for such purchases. If no deduction is given the 
tax system provides a disincentive for work outside the home. 
88. See generally infra part V which deals in more detail with the interaction between 
social values and the child care deduction. 
89. Popkin, Household Services and Child Care in the Income Tax and Social Secur-
ity Laws, 50 IND. L.J. 238, 238 (1975); see also Schaffer and Berman, Two Cheers for the 
Child Care Deduction, 28 TAX L. REv. 535, 537 (1973) (will promote the efficient allocation 
of labor). 
90. Of course, the wage earner may have to pay state, local and social security taxes as 
well as federal taxes. The imputed income analysis applies equally to those taxes. Popkin 
considers the social security tax in his analysis. Popkin, supra note 89. 
91. I realize that this comparison is a little abstract: where does the person at home 
get his or her money on which to survive? A bequest perhaps? I use this example merely to 
illustrate that the imputed income theory is not tied either to the person's purchasing re-
placement services upon entrance into the workforce or to child care expenses per se. 
Rather, it rests on the fact that services performed in the home have a productive value 
(often measurable in market terms) but go untaxed. Indeed, this is why, standing alone, the 
imputed income argument is rather weak. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104. 
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Interestingly, in Smith92 the Board of Tax Appeals alluded to 
the discrepancy between treating Lillie Smith's marketplace wages 
as taxable income, and failing to tax her previous home 
production: 
The wife's services as custodian of the home and protector of its 
children are ordinarily rendered without monetary compensation. 
There results no taxable income from the performance of this ser-
vice, and the correlative expenditure is personal and not susceptible 
of deduction [citation omitted]. Here the wife has chosen to employ 
others to discharge her domestic function and the services she per-
forms are rendered outside the home. They are a source of actual 
income and taxable as such. But that does not deprive the same 
work performed by others of its personal character nor furnish a 
reason why its cost should be treated as an offset in the guise of a 
deductible item. 98 
The Board reached the conclusion that the deduction should be 
disallowed, even though it is precisely the opposite conclusion 
reached by many commentators who have since engaged in an im-
puted income analysis. 94 
On the chart below, I have sketched the tax treatment of three 
two-parent families in which spouse 1 is already working in the 
marketplace. In families II and III the parents have hired house-
hold and dependent care services because spouse 2, who had been 
providing such services, has now obtained gainful employment.9~ 
92. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939). 
93. ld. at 1039. 
94. One commentator has called "(t]he Board's injection of the imputed income argu-
ment ... regrettable." Blumberg, supra note 5, at 65. 
95. I have adapted thie chart from Popkin, supra note 89, at 239. I have changed it 
somewhat and added one permutation (Family III). (All the other charts in part IV are 
entirely of my own doing). 
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Chart Two 
(assuming 50% tax rate) 
Family I Family II Family III 
(with deduction) (without deduction) 
Cash wages, Spouse 1 100 100 100 
Cash wages, Spouse 2 0 30 30 
Household and child 
care deduction 0 20 0 
Taxable income 100 110 130 
Tax 50 55 65 
Child care (after-tax) 0 0 20 
After-tax and child 
care income 50 55 45 
The above chart is a forceful explanation of the economic im-
pact of our failure to tax the imputed income of home production. 
If spouse 2 of Family II had been able to find a job paying 20 only, 
he or she would have been indifferent between the wage-paying job 
and working in the home. As it turned out, spouse 2 found a job 
paying 30, the family paid a housekeeper 20 for household and de-
pendent care services and was better off nevertheless. 96 
Family III's situation, on the other hand, illustrates the impor-
tance of the deduction (which Family II received) in providing 
neutrality between home production and market labor. Family III 
earns 130, but since it cannot deduct 20 for child care, it will have 
less disposable income after child care expenses than will Family I. 
All other things being equal, spouse 2 of Family III will not enter 
the work force in spite of the fact that the market values the work 
force labor (30) more than the home production (20).97 
Thus, the imputed income analysis provides a lesson in hori-
zontal equity. If spouse 2 of Family III had earned 20, the family 
would have had only 40 in disposable income while F~ily I would 
have had 50. And, yet, both families would be in the same eco-
nomic circumstance measured in market terms. Both families 
would have two working spouses producing 120 in value, but the 
family with untaxed home production would fare better after 
96. Family II, which gets the deduction, is better off than Family I because it can 
deduct the household and dependent care costs and, thus, offset the untaxed imputed in-
come enjoyed by Family I. 
97. In reality, Family III's disposable income would probably be less than 45. If we 
assume that Family l's average tax rate is 50%, then Family III's marginal tax rate would be 
somewhat higher because it has 30 more in taxable income. 
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taxes. If Family III, on the other hand, were allowed a deduction 
for the 20 purchase of household and dependent care services, both 
families would be left with 50 after taxes with which to consume. 
The principle of horizontal equity-treating taxpayers in similar 
economic circumstances similarly-would thus be achieved. 
It has been argued that the imputed income analysis stands on 
its own as an argument for deductibility. One proponent claims 
that such an analysis is "better ... than engag[ing] in an endless 
quarrel as to whether child care expenses are 'personal' or 'busi-
ness.' "98 I believe, however, that the imputed income argument is 
simply a way of illustrating how some commentators feel about 
child care expenses. It is not an independent mode of analysis; 
rather, it solves the "endless quarrel" over the nature of child care 
expenses by simply assuming that they are like business deduc-
tions and then applying an imputed income analysis to justify it. 
If we believe an imputed income theory justifies a child care 
deduction, it is not because the tax system fails to tax the receipts 
of productive behavior in the home. On such a theory, why should 
not I get a deduction for paying someone to wax my car? That is: I 
normally work and earn 20 dollars per week, and also wax my car. 
Waxing my car produces five dollars in value. Because I love my 
work, I decide to earn another five dollars per week. I lose the hour 
in which I previously waxed my car to my work and, therefore, I 
pay someone else five dollars to wax my car. However, in reality, I 
will be less likely to trade my car waxing time for more work unless 
I can deduct the professional car waxing expense. This is because 
the value I produce by waxing my own car will always go untaxed. 
98. Schaffer and Berman, supra note 89, at 543; see also Popkin, supra note 89, at 
246-47. 
1984] CHILD CARE AND THE INCOME TAX 179 
Chart Three 
(assuming 50% tax rate) 
Wax car myself Pay someone else and work extra 
hour 
Without 
deduction With deduction 
Gross "income" 25 25 25 
Work 20 (wages) 25 (wages) 25 (wages) 
Car Waxing 5 (imputed) 0 (5)(car wax 
deducted) 
Taxable Income 20 25 20 
Less Tax 10 12.5 10 
Less Cost of Car 
Waxing 0 5 0 (already 
deducted) 
Net Income After 
Car Waxing 10 7.5 10 
Thus, if "we assume [that] labor should ... be allocated by market 
forces,"99 all expenditures for personal services should be 
deductible. 
Of course, we could not allow deductions for market expendi-
tures we make on car waxing, haircuts, gardening or any other of 
the myriad personal services we either perform for ourselves or 
have others do for us without a massive contraction of the tax 
base. In fact, we justify the inclusion of such expenditures in the 
tax base on the ground that they are purely personal.100 Once this 
justification is put forth, we must ask why household and depen-
dent care expenses are different. The answer must be that some-
how they are not purely personal, that they are employment-re-
lated. The imputed income argument does not serve as an 
independent reason for deductibility. 
Popkin has used an imputed income analysis to illustrate the 
present tax system's nonneutral treatment of housework and wage 
work as a justification for deductibility of household and depen-
dent care services incurred by working people.101 He fails to define 
housework, however. Is housework simply making the beds and 
cleaning the floors, i.e., traditional housekeeping chores, or does it 
99. Schaffer and Berman, supra note 89, at 537. 
100. ld. at 544. 
101. Popkin, supra note 89 at 247; see also Schaffer and Berman, supra note 89 at 
538. 
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extend to house repairs? To some people, of course, mowing the 
lawn is a much more important household chore than washing 
floors or ironing shirts. And, yet, all are services which one can do 
in the home or pay others to do instead; all are potential sources of 
imputed income. 
If we want to neutralize the tax treatment of wage work and 
housework we must define the latter. Ultimately, we will include in 
the definition household tasks which we deem important, tasks 
which we feel the worker should be able to replace without a tax 
burden if he or she enters the workforce. This has little to do with 
a concept of imputed income, and much to do with the types of 
housework we believe must get done to enable someone to hold 
gainful employment. Not surprisingly, the prevailing opinion has 
been that housework for the purposes of the household and depen-
dent care deduction should be defined with the traditional concep-
tion of "women's work" in mind.102 This is understandable if the 
household and dependent care deduction is tailored to help allow 
women to escape from tradition.al roles, but the notion of imputed 
income does not inform such a judgment; indeed, it is beside the 
point. 
Finally, it has been argued that work in the home and work in 
the marketplace need to be treated neutrally by the tax system 
only in the case of child care. This is because "[i]n the child care 
case ... the taxpayer could not work but for her expenditure."103 
Child care must be provided "if only because to [fail] to do so 
would in most cases violate state law."~04 It is difficult to see why 
neutralizing home and marketplace labor provides the reason for 
the child care deduction, when we have abandoned the neutrality 
principle for all other forms of personal services. To defend de-
ductibility on the ground that a parent must provide child care 
when he or she enters the marketplace is to say that such child 
102. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 89, at 239 ("wife ... takes care of the house and 
children"); Andrews, supra note 66, at 382 ("the reason for allowing the deduction has to do 
with the working mother's loss of time to devote to household tasks as compared with the 
nonworking mother .... "). Popkin simply asserts that "the cost of household services 
should be deductible whether or not a child is being cared for." Popkin, supra note 89, at 
247. He defends deduction of these "services by the wife," id., on an imputed income theory. 
But, he must assume that such services (which he never defines in any detail) are necessary 
to enable the second earner to enter the workforce. Otherwise, his imputed income theory 
could justify the deduction of all personal services purchased in the marketplace. See text 
accompanying notes 99-101. 
103. Schaffer and Berman, supra note 89, at 545. 
104. Id. 
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care expenses are akin to business expenses; that they are neces-
sary to the production of income. 
An imputed income analysis only begs the question asked in 
part III: are employment-related child care expenses business or 
personal? I concluded in part III that there was no answer to that 
question; that, indeed, they could be perceived as either or both, 
and our conclusions would be more a function of our feelings about 
work and family life than of tax theory. 
If we conclude that the child care expenses of working people 
are primarily incurred to satisfy personal desires, deducting such 
expenses on an imputed income theory is no more defensible than 
deducting the cost of any other consumption item. If, however, we 
believe that child care expenses should be treated like business ex-
penses, the imputed income analysis is helpful in illustrating the 
magnitude of the tax system's nonneutral treatment of all 
nonmarket production as it applies specifically to a certain class of 
home producers who desire entrance to the labor force. 
V. A BRIEF SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHILD CARE 
EXPENSES 
In part IV, I concluded that an analysis of the differential tax 
treatment between home production and marketplace employment 
does not logically compel a particular tax treatment of employ-
ment-related child care expenses. Rather, such an analysis merely 
throws us back to the original problem: whether such child care 
costs are business or personal. 
In part Ill, however, I concluded that there was no way to 
neatly categorize employment-related child care because it could 
be seen as either business or personal or both, depending on the 
situation of the parent, the parent's purpose in purchasing child 
care services, and the amount expended for such services. More 
important, I indicated that once we have decided that employ-
ment-related child care expenses are somewhat different from ordi-
nary purchases of consumption items, but not quite analagous to 
pure section 162 business expenses, our underlying values as to the 
importance of child care, the role of mothers in providing that 
care, and the desirability of women in the workforce begin to color 
our arguments. Indeed, I believe that primarily these values, not a 
desired adherence to a particular theory of taxation, have histori-
cally informed our judgments as to the proper tax treatment of 
employment-related child care expenses. 
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When the Board of Tax Appeals first addressed the issue of 
child care deductions in Smith, 1011 it treated the Smiths' payments 
to their nursemaid in the abstract, without seriously considering 
the relationship of the expenditures to Lillie Smith's employment. 
The Board defended the deductibility for business-related en-
tertainment, travel, and clothing, 106 typical borderline expenses, 
and curtly distinguished them from the Smiths' child care costs. 
· The Board gave no legal basis for such a distinction. Rather, the 
basis for the distinction is found in the Board's discussion of 
women's roles in our society: 
We are told the working wife is a new phenomenon .... [l]f 
that is true it becomes all the more necessary to apply accepted 
principles to the novel facts. We are not prepared to say that the 
care of children, like similar aspects of family and household life, is 
other than a personal concern. The wife's services as custodian of 
the home and protector of its children are ordinarily rendered 
without monetary compensation .... [The wife's decision to work 
outside the home] does not deprive the [house]work performed by 
others of its same personal character.107 
Ordinarily one might expect new principles to be applied to 
"novel facts." Instead the Board treated the wife "as custodian of 
the home and protector of its children" in spite of Lillie Smith's 
proven desire to escape that role.108 
Congress limited the Smith holding in 1954 with the enact-
ment of section 214. Section 214, as we know, was not a significant 
step toward deductibility of child care expenses because of its 
stringent dollar limitation on the deduction and its relatively low 
income eligibility standards. Moreover, its billing as a hardship 
provision was undermined primarily because its availability only to 
itemizers excluded large segments of the middle class and working 
poor. 
Two provisions of the old section 214 are noteworthy for their 
embrace of the values evinced in Smith. First, the income eligibil-
ity phase-out and ceiling applied only to married couples who were 
105. 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939). 
106. Id. at 1039. 
107. ld. (emphasis added). 
108. See also Lorenz v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. 720 (1949) (couple gets no deduction for 
child care while wife works with husband in family business); cf. O'Connor v. Comm'r, 6 
T.C. 323 (1966) (working mother filing separate return cannot take child care as a busineas 
deduction). 
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otherwise qualified under the section.109 Unless a family was in 
need, i.e., had an income below $4,500, the woman was expected to 
stay in the home, especially when she had young children to care 
for. 110 Indeed, according to prevailing mores, few mothers would 
want to work unless they were compelled to do so by reason of 
economic necessity.m On the other hand, no income ceiling ap-
plied to single mothers112 who had no choice but to try to earn a 
living in the marketplace. Therefore, there was no need to try to 
discourage them from doing so. 113 
Second, single men, except for widowers, were not permitted 
to take the deduction at all.114 This reflects the assumption that 
upon the break-up of a marriage, the mother is best prepared to 
take care of the children. At the least, the single father should re-
marry as soon as possible to provide a mother for his children if for 
some strange reason he was given custody of the children.1111 In any 
event, the controlling assumption was clear; men are not and 
should not be involved in childrearing. 
It is questionable, given the various other strong social and ec-
onomic pressures to either work in the labor force or engage in 
home production, whether the result in Smith or the sex-based dis-
crimination in section 214 had any significant effect on behavior. 
Nevertheless, implicit in section 214 and in the language of Smith 
was a strong defense of the traditional nuclear family. 116 
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra text accompanying note 13. 
111. Of course, whether this value was genuinely believed is questionable given the 
fact that Congress was unwilling to chance its undermining by eliminating nonneutral tax 
treatment of housework and wage work through full deductibility. Cf. generally supra part 
IV. 
112. It did not apply to widowers either. See supra note 14. Of course, the number of 
single men caring for children in this country is very small when compared to the number of 
single mothers caring for children. This discrepancy was probably much greater in 1954 
when males were simply considered unfit to perform childrearing tasks. 
113. Although in economic terms the provision would discourage single mothers from 
marrying. 
114. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
115. Here, there is an incentive to marry. Compare the following situations: As a single 
father, I pay my housekeeper $200 per week to take care of my children. We both pay taxes 
on that money, i.e., I pay the housekeeper with after-tax dollars. But if I marry my house-
keeper and continue to earn the same income, the child care now goes un~ed. See gener-
ally supra part IV. 
116. Regarding the old § 214, see D.T. SMITH, Federal Tax Reform 111-112 (1961), 
quoted in Blumberg, supra note 5, at 72 ("Congressional discussion reflected differences of 
opinion based on urban and rural attitudes and occupations and on religious and philosoph-
ical approaches to the role and proper places of mothers. The final result gave relief where it 
was felt to be needed, but the intent was to prevent giving any tax inducement to a mother 
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By late 1971, the women's movement had begun to force this 
society to reexamine its assumptions about women's roles as work-
ers, wives and mothers. It is no coincidence that the Code has un-
dergone a number of expansive revisions with respect to child care 
between 1971 and the present, an era in which the movement has 
had significant impact on family life and in the work place 
The new section 214, passed in December 1971, was the tax 
revision which had the most expansive effect; it increased the max-
imum amounts deductible for qualifying parents more than five-
fold and it raised the income eligibility guidelines to include the 
vast majority of the middle class.117 Not surprisingly, it was at this 
point that the ideological battle over women's roles in the family 
and work place was fought among politicians and in the journals 
with respect to the tax treatment of child care. This battle merely 
reproduced the arguments, fomented by the women's movement, 
which were being heard on many other issues. 
Senator Bennett debated the issue in Congress and argued 
vigorously against the expansion of the child care deduction. He 
claimed that child care expenses are business related only when 
the parent has to work, when the deduction quite literally enables 
him or her to maintain gainful employment: 
We are not providing tax relief to take care of the one-parent family 
where it is usually necessary for the mother to go out to work and 
she needs some help to pay for care necessary for her children. We 
are now moving into the range where we are providing tax relief for 
the wife who does not have to go out to work but who, in order to 
get a new automobile or better clothes ... would like to go out and 
work.118 
Implicit in the senator's statement was the belief that women 
should only work when they need to, and that when women mar-
ried to middle income male earners take marketplace employment 
they do so for recreational, i.e., to "get a new automobile or better 
clothes," not business reasons. And, yet, Bennett was simply ad-
vancing the view held by some that for more afiluent married tax-
payers child care should not be considered employment-related, if 
only because those taxpayers would probably purchase childcare 
regardless of the decision of the second earner to work outside the 
'to leave her children at home while she went out to earn money for a fur coat' .... "). 
117. See· supra text .accompanying notes 18-20. 
118. 117. CoN G. REc. 41,253 (1971). 
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home.119 
He took the time, however, to give his genuine reasons for op-
posing expansion of the childcare deduction, and in doing so ex-
plicitly called upon the values which hung between the lines of the 
old section 214: 
I suppose the Senator from Utah is old fashioned. I can under-
stand the sacrifice in relations with our children that a mother must 
make if she has to go out to work. But I am wondering whether we 
should provide tax incentive for a mother who does not have to go 
out to work, to leave her children in the care of hired domestics. We 
can read many sage observations on the part of psychologists and 
psychiatrists that many of our problems in society today grow out of 
the fact that there is no communication between parents and chil-
dren, that the breakdown of the family and the home is one of the 
real causes of the very serious problems we face in the country to-
day. Now we are being asked to provide a tax benefit to make it 
possible for that breakdown to be accelerated. 
The proposal makes it less costly for the wife of a middle-in-
come taxpayer to pass off the motherly duty of child rearing.120 
The above passage leaves little doubt as to what was bothering 
Senator Bennett about the new section 214, and it had little to do 
with adherence to particular tax principles. Rather, it reflects a 
deep fear of the direction in which America was going in 1971, ty-
ing expansion of the child care deduction to continued breakdown 
of traditional institutions and, more broadly, to general social 
disorder. 
As discussed earlier/11 Senator Tunney led the fight for ex-
pansion of the child care deduction, likening employment-related 
child care expenses to wages paid by a business person to his or 
her secretary. He recognized, as well, the particular impact child 
care expenses have on women: 
I just cannot agree with the distinguished Senator [Bennett] 
119. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also Schaffer and Berman, 
supra note 89, at 542 ("[T]he income limitation may serve as a crude way of distinguishing 
between families who would probably have purchased child care services even if the wife did 
not hold a job and those who could not."). The problem with this analysis is that it does not 
apply to a single parent regardless of his or her income. The parent either stays home (has 
no income) and provides child care (surviving most likely on meager welfare or child sup-
port payments) or works in the marketplace and purchases child care (regardless of income 
level). Note also the cultural bias exhibited in the assumption which always denominates 
the wife as the second earner in a two-earner family. 
120. 117 CONG. REC. 41,253 (1971). 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
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from Utah that this represents a loophole, any more than it repre-
sents a loophole in a tax law to allow a businessman to claim a busi-
ness expense for . . . a secretary. 
L do not know of any distinction between the two cases, other 
than the fact that in one case we are talking about a man and in the 
other case we are talking about a woman. I feel strongly that if we 
are going to give equal rights to women as well as men, a woman 
should be given the opportunity to have a business expense writeoff 
for the cost of her doing business.122 
It was Senator Long, however, who completely abandoned le-
gal argument and challenged Senator Bennett's values head on. He 
explicitly and, it seems, rather begrudgingly attributed our value 
shift to the women's movement: 
Some may not like to recognize it, but it is true that the idea 
that a woman is entitled to take a job and help bring income into 
the family, particularly if she can make arrangements for someone 
to discharge the family responsibilities and take care of the domestic 
work that ordinarily would be her task, has caught on in this coun-
try. It is accepted. The idea that a woman's place is in the home and 
that she cannot hire someone to do the household work in order to 
increase the family income is no longer current. Rather, it is recog-
nized today as a right of women to do so. Some may not like it but 
at least, to that extent, the women's liberation movement has caught 
on.12a 
The forces of the women's movement, and Senators Long and 
Tunney, had their way.124 As we know, not only were the economic 
benefits of the deduction greatly increased, but the distinctions be-
tween men and women, and married and single people were 
eliminated. 126 
At the same time politicians were debating the efficacy of the 
new section 214, commentators were busy considering the proper 
tax treatment of child care expenditures. Their views regarding 
family life and the proper roles of women in our society crept into 
their analyses, although sometimes rather subtly. 
122. 117 CONG. REc. 41,253 (1971). Senator Tunney also rejected Senator Bennett's 
argument regarding breakdown of the traditional family. Id. 
123. 117 CoNG. REc. 41,254 (1971). 
124. ld. at 41,256. The Senate passed the increase in income eligibility for child care 
deduction by 59-24. I do not mean to suggest that Senators Tunney and Long, and the 
women's movement shared the same political perspective, even on the role of mothers in the 
work place. They had their way only in the sense that Congress passed a child care provision 
which all of them favored. 
125. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. 
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As mentioned previously, Feld concluded that employment-
related child care expenses have both business and personal com-
ponents, but because of the difficulty of separating the two "the 
tax base should not be further eroded by permitting a 'deduc-
tion."126 Feld built his argument on the premise that a working 
wife will probably receive gratification from knowing that her child 
has child care.127 Therefore, he maintained, the child care expendi-
ture is at least part personal in nature. I have shown, however, that 
measurement of personal gratification cannot be the basis of any 
administrable tax system; moreover, such a criterion is irrelevant if 
the system's purpose is to tax the individual's ability to consume 
real goods and services. Without this argument, Feld's opposition 
to the child care deduction ultimately rested on a more explicitly 
value-laden analysis: 
A second argument in opposition to deductibility is that a tax 
disincentive to the gainful employment of mothers is desirable and 
should be retained. Young children, it is argued, should receive the 
loving attention of their natural mothers rather than be left to the 
care of strangers. To allow deductibility of child care expenses 
would be- to subsidize mothers leaving their children with others, 
would erode the family structure and would harm the upbringing of 
children. While a tax subsidy might be justified where the family is 
in great economic need, as was provided under old section 214, it is 
unsound for the family not subject to such overriding economic 
pressure. 1118 
What is striking about the above statement is not its opposi-
tion to deductibility, but its confusion of tax theory. If the failure 
to permit a deduction acts as a "disincentive" to gainful employ-
ment, that suggests that a deduction would tend to provide a 
needed neutrality between home production and wage work, the 
deduction being an accurate refinement of income. This contention 
would seem to be in contradiction to Feld's basic argument that 
child care expenses are not sufficiently related to employment to 
justify a deduction. If, on the other hand, as Feld stated, "deduct-
ibility of child care expenses would ... subsidize mothers," a de-
duction for child care should be seen as a nonneutral incentive for 
wage labor, a pure tax expenditure which shelters economic in-
126. Feld, supra note 73, at 429; see also supra text accompanying note 73. 
127. Note that Feld makes no mention of the gratification received by the father in 
knowing that his child is being cared for. 
128. Feld, supra note 73, at 429. 
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come. It cannot work both ways at the same time. 
Although his tax argumentation was inconsistent, Feld's un-
derlying beliefs129 were expressed clearly-mothers who work may 
be subsidized if they are "in great economic need,"130 but other-
wise, women should not be expected to work. At least, the govern-
ment should not play a part in encouraging women who do not 
need to work to leave their children with strangers. 
Other arguments against deductibility are less explicit, but 
they suggest nontax values at play. Take, for example, the claim 
that because the origin of a parent's child care expenses is in the 
decision to have a child such expenses are personal in nature. But, 
the origin test merely serves as a means by which we analyze a 
borderline expense. We choose which event in the causal chain 
that produced the expense is most significant. By doing so, we de-
cide whether the expense is business or personal. 
One commentator, however, has put great stock in the origin 
test, coming to the conclusion that a business person's yacht used 
for entertaining clients "originates in a need of the business," while 
employment-related child care expenses "originate in personal ... 
choice."131 The use of the origin argument to both justify deduct-
ibility for one of the most explicitly consumptive aspects of busi-
ness life and deny deductibility to employment-related child care 
costs calls into question the writer's unstated assumptions. Why is 
it that the yacht's so-called origin in the business is determinative? 
Why is a poor working person's child care seen as originating in 
the family as opposed to a need for employment? More impor-
tantly, why is the yacht "a need of the business," while the child 
care is seen as arising out of "personal choice." One can only guess 
that traditional values led to assumptions which caused these 
questions to go unasked. What is clear is that reference to tax the-
ory, whether it be an origin test or some other analysis, will not 
bring us to logical answers to these questions. 
Similarly, commentators who base their arguments for deduct-
ibility on imputed income theories must be maintaining, at least 
inadvertently, that wage work should be given parity with house-
work but no other form of imputed personal service income. This 
129. I do not know if the quoted statement reflects Feld's personal beliefs (he states it 
in the passive voice), but it certainly reflects beliefs held by many. 
130. As we know, the old § 214 did not help those most in need because it was an 
itemized deduction. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
131. Comment, supra note 84, at 276. 
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is true because an imputed income analysis provides no indepen-
dent justification for deductibility of employment-related child 
care costs. 132 
Popkin admitted that the imputed income issue was "of cur-
rent social significance in the context of the women's movement 
because women are the major producers of housework .... "133 He 
believed, however, that determining the proper treatment of 
household services and child care were of broader concern because 
it requires consideration of fundamental concepts of equity and 
neutrality in the tax and welfare structure.134 I believe, on the con-
trary, that no one would start with the "paramount objective" of 
providing tax equality between housework and wage work unless 
he or she believed women should be given nontraditional choices 
regarding work and, family life. 
By 1976, when section 214 was repealed and replaced by the 
section 44A credit, the political battle to establish a child care pro-
vision had been won. By structuring section 44A as a credit, Con-
gress made a special effort to direct tax benefits toward low and 
middle income parents. 1311 Again, Congress must have understood 
that its action would have a particularly beneficial impact upon 
women. 
In this short history I have shown that in dealing with the dif-
ficult borderline issue of child care expenses, the tax system has 
reacted more to our changing assumptions about women, work and 
family than to abstract economic or tax theories. It is not surpris-
ing that in 1939 the Board of Tax Appeals viewed women's child 
care expenses as personal, integral to family life, almost without 
regard to the context in which the woman before the Board had 
incurred those expenses. Nor can we be surprised that Congress' 
first attempt to legislate in this area in 1954 embodied the notion 
that middle class wives should not work outside the home. As 
women began to take on business as well as family roles in increas-
ing numbers in the 1970s, the child care provision understandably 
changed both to recognize and facilitate the work place revolution 
that was occurring.138 These changes also recognized, perhaps in-
132. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99. 
133. Popkin, supra note 89, at 238. 
134. ld. 
135. See supra part II.D. 
136. I do not mean to imply by any means that the work place has been "revolution-
ized" in all respects, but simply to say that many more women are working outside the 
home. The work place barriers to women in terms of pay, advancement and the like are 
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advertantly, that many women in this country, mostly lower class 
women, have always worked. 
It really could not have happened any other way. Concepts 
like comprehensive income tax, tax expenditure and business de-
duction do not direct us to treat child care expenditures in any 
given way. Once we concede, and I think we must, that employ-
ment-related child care expenses are neither pure consumption 
items nor typical business expenses, we must look to values extra-
neous to the tax system to inform our judgment about what type of 
child care provision, if any, we should have. 
VI. WHAT TYPE OF CHILD CARE PROVISION SHOULD WE JfAVE? 
I begin with the belief that employment-related child care is 
in many instances enough like a business expense that the Code 
must make some provision for excluding all or part of it from the 
tax base. 
A straight business deduction, however, would be inappropri-
ate. First, no matter what type of child care provision ex-
ists-exclusion, deduction or credit-there must be a limitation on 
the dollar amount of child care services against which the provision 
can be applied. This limitation should be calculated to reasonably 
reflect the cost of safe and well-supervised day care.137 To have no 
limitation would allow wealthy taxpayers to indulge their children 
at the government's expense. It would be as indefensible as al-
lowing a deduction for a child's food, clothing or recreation. 
Second, a child care deduction for those in high income brack-
ets seems ill-advised even if a dollar limitation is imposed. For 
those taxpayers, child care may often have a large consumption 
component because the decision to provide commercial child care 
is unrelated to marketplace employment. Of course, there will be 
some affiuent taxpayers whose child care expenses do indeed en-
able them to work. 138 The problem is that it is impossible to tell 
what a taxpayer's purpose is in purchasing child care. 139 While I 
prevalent and well documented. One well known example is that average market earnings 
for women are less than 60% those of men. See generally Frug, Securing Job Equality for 
Women: Labor Market Hostility Toward Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55 (1979). 
137. Day care costs vary widely. One private, well-regarded day care center in Boston 
costs $323 per month for a four year-old preschooler. Interview with Charlotte Watkins, 
working mother (May 9, 1983). 
138. See supra note 119. 
139. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. One way to illustrate the problem is to 
ask: Did the parent purchase the child care so that he or she could work or vice versa? 
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admit that some high income parents would be denied a deduction 
for a true cost of going to work, I oppose a deduction because it 
would often subsidize a large personal component of wealthy par-
ents' child care expenses. 140 
The primary concern of any child care provision should be 
lower and middle income parents for whom child care is almost" 
always a cost of going to work. Thus, the section 44A credit, espe-
cially the recent addition of the reverse graduated benefit scheme, 
is appropriate. 141 
While it is true that the credit grants a tax benefit to low and 
moderate income parents which at times exceeds that which they 
would have gained by a deduction, that is no reason to oppose it. 
Governmental assistance has reduced the chance that economic ne-
cessity will force low income parents to leave their children unat-
tended or with inadequate care.1' 2 Those who otherwise could not 
afford it should be encouraged to provide decent day care for their 
children. 148 
Concomitantly, the current law would be improved if the 
credit were made refundable so that the poorest of the working 
poor could obtain reimbursement for their employment-related 
child care expenses despite an absence of taxable income. 
Refundability seems a fair and efficient policy as long as the credit 
cannot exceed the earned income of the taxpayer.144 
My support for the child care credit is strengthened by the 
There is no way for the Service to know the answer to that question. Often, I would imagine, 
even the parent could not answer it precisely. 
140. But see Comment, supra note 60, at 468. This comment claims that "[o]nly a 
section 162 deduction from gross income makes it at all feasible for a mother in the upper 
income brackets to work outside her home." Id. That is no reason why wealthy people 
should get tax deductions for child care if such care is not business-related. The phenome-
non that this commentator should really be addressing is the fact that spouses, often wives, 
of high income taxpayers must enter the work force at the latter's tax bracket. This can 
occur in a marriage whether or not there are children. See I.R.C. § 221 (1983) (deduction for 
two-earner families). 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
142. Indeed, this was one of Senator Long's major reasons for supporting the new § 
214. He explained on the Senate floor that two children who lived near him died in a tire 
because the children had been left unattended. 117 CoNG. REc. 41,253 (1971). 
143. There are also direct day care assistance programs which aid the working poor. 
The two most prominent programs exist under Title XX of the Social Security Act and the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children legislation. SeeU.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OF-
FICE oF THE SECRETARY, WoMEN's BuREAu, EMPLOYERS AND CHILD CARE: EsTABLISHING SER-
VICES THROUGH THE WORKPLACE 33-34 (1982). These programs are outside the scope of this 
paper. 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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understanding that child care expenses primarily burden women. 
For married mothers earning imputed child care income in the 
home, there exists a disincentive for them to enter the marketplace 
where the fruits of their productive activity will be taxed. This dis-
incentive should be undone, not because there is an overriding 
need to create tax parity among all forms of production, or even 
between production inside and outside the home per se, but be-
cause there is a need to equalize opportunities for mothers who 
want to or must work outside the home. 
For single working mothers, and married mothers in low in-
come households who work outside the home, the credit is appro-
priate simply because child care is a prerequisite to .gainful em-
ployment. The credit's lack of an income eligibility ceiling suggests 
that some higher income parents are being subsidized for non-
work-related child care expenses. While a deduction for such ex-
penses is inappropriate, allowing all parents to take advantage of 
the credit (which is limited in dollar amount) will facilitate the en-
try of women into nontraditional employment and encourage the 
redefinition of family roles. Therefore, the credit should be main-
tained in its current form with regard to income eligibility despite 
the fact that it will do more than simply refine the incomes of 
higher income working parents. 
On the other hand, section 129, providing dependent care as-
sistance programs, should be repealed. Because it is structured as 
an income exclusion without any dollar limitations, it will allow the 
sheltering of income-through extravagant child care deduc-
tions-at high marginal tax rates. In fact, section 129 seems to be 
designed particularly for more affluent taxpayers. For example, a 
married couple filing a joint return will always do better using the 
section 44A credit unless its adjusted gross income exceeds $24,000 
per year. 1411 In 1978, approximately eighty-five percent of all tax 
returns showed adjusted gross incomes below that level. 148 More-
over, the fact that section 129 has no dollar limitation on exclud-
145. Note, Income Tax Treatment of Child and Dependent Care Costs: The 1981 
Amendments, 60 TEx. L. REV. 321, 347-48 (1982). In fact, the § 129 exclusion would be 
preferable at an adjusted gross income of somewhat less than $24,000. The above-cited arti-
cle fails to recognize that the exclusion also negates social security taxes on the excluded 
amount which a taxpayer taking advantage of§ 44A would have to pay. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(18) 
(1982) (wages subject to FICA does not include a payment or benefit "if it is reasonable to 
believe that the employee will be able to exclude such payment or benefit from income 
under section ... 129"). 
146. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 270, Table No. 450 (1980). 
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ability also indicates that it was designed for those who can afford 
to give their children the best. 
Recent discussions of section 129 have stressed its importance 
in encouraging on-site employer child care,147 a development which 
many child care advocates favor. 148 It is not certain that section 
129 will have that effect because there is no requirement that the 
child care be on-site. If the goal is to encourage on-site child care, 
section 44A can achieve that just as well, with employees paying 
for the child care and being partly reimbursed for the expense by 
the section 44A credit. 
Section 129 should be recognized for what it is-an erosion of 
the tax base which will confer benefits on people who are already 
economically advantaged. 
147. See, e.g., Curwood, Tax Changes Ease Curbs on Day-care Deductions, Boston 
Globe, Feb. 15, 1983, at 33, col. 1. 
148. See, e.g., G. MoRGAN, CARING ABoUT CHILDREN IN MAssACHUSETI'S 105-12 (1982). 
